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THE DANGER OF A PERFECT STRIKE 
The Unintended Consequences of Restrictive Targeting Regimes  
 
Sara Plesser Neugroschel* 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the inherent dangers in a new normative framework proscribing civilian 
casualties. Driven by political fear of alienating domestic audiences, damaging foreign 
relations, and, media rebuke, States have instituted restrictive targeting regimes. These 
regimes, while noble, have oft forgotten unintended consequences. The global community 
aspires to a utopian world of zero civilian casualties. Unfortunately, this is both a dangerous 
and unrealistic expectation. While targeting restrictions are morally and politically enticing, 
there are four primary unintended consequences: (1) increased brutality against civilians; (2) 
amplified civilian endangerment; (3) unrealistic expectations of a perfect war; and, (4) the 
development of a new norm of proportionality under customary international law (CIL). States 
must be cognizant of the inherent dangers of positing a policy doctrine of a perfect strike. 
Because a perfect strike may ultimately be imperfect to a State’s ability to protect civilians and 
defeat an adversary. States comply with IHL even when their adversaries do not; but war 
remains imperfect and civilian casualties are inevitable. Civilians are subject to the perils of 
war so long as wars exist. States simply cannot restrict targeting to the extent that it further 
endangers civilian populations around the globe; it is hypocritical at best and devastating at 
worst. 
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Seizing on the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Moaamar Qadaffi 
regime, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) swiftly gained territorial control in 
Libya. By the summer of 2015, they held a 200-kilometer swatch of land stretching from 
Sabratha in the west to Benghazi in the east.1 This was their largest stronghold outside of Iraq 
and Syria and their base for further expansion on the African continent. By taking over all 
government facilities and government functionality, ISIL became the de facto government. 
Mutilations, beatings, and extra-judicial killings became the norm.2 The Islamic State 
forcefully recruited Libyans, committed sexual violence against women and children, and 
brutally executed hundreds of civilians.3 There were also food shortages and limited access to 
medical supplies. Thousands of Libyans were trapped in ISIL controlled territory and it was 
“[h]ell on earth.”4 
After nearly a year under ISIL control, Sirte entered the international spotlight when 
Islamic State militants publicly executed 21 men, on a beach, for refusing to join their ranks.5 
When the newly formed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) requested U.S. 
                                                          
1 See Issandr El Amrani, How Much of Libya Does the Islamic State Control?, FOREIGN POLICY, February 
18, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/op-eds/how-
much-of-libya-does-the-islamic-state-control.aspx; “We Feel We Are Cursed” Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/18/we-feel-we-are-cursed/life-
under-isis-sirte-libya [hereinafter We Are Cursed]; and Libya in Conflict: IS ‘Ejected’ From Stronghold of 
Sirte, BBC NEWS, Dec. 6, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38227543. 
2 We Are Cursed, supra note 1; Nico Hines, Hell on Earth: Life Under ISIS in Libya, THE DAILY BEAST, MAY 
18, 2016, https://www.thedailybeast.com/hell-on-earth-life-under-isis-in-libya [hereinafter Hell on Earth], 
Merrit Kennedy, New Report Details The Horrors of Life Under ISIS in Sirte, Libya, NPR, May 18, 2016, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/18/478550271/new-report-details-the-horrors-of-life-
under-isis-in-sirte-libya [hereinafter Life Under ISIS]. 
3 Francesca Mannocchi, "Libya's Sirte in rubble after ISIL battle," AL JAZEERA, 6 Dec. 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/libya-sirte-rubble-isil-defeat-161206055401188.html.  
4 We Are Cursed supra note 1; Hell on Earth, supra note 2; Life Under ISIS, supra note 2.   
5 Tom Westcott, In Libya, a City Once Run by Islamic State Struggles to Start Again, THE NEW 







military assistance to liberate Sirte from ISIL control, Operation Odyssey Lightning was born.6 
Beginning August 1, 2016, while GNA-aligned forces conducted block by block clearance of 
the city, the United States (U.S.) assisted with precision airstrikes.7 In all the U.S. carried out 
over 495 airstrikes.8 The majority of the strikes were at the bequest of GNA-aligned forces on 
the ground and were defensive in nature – collective self-defense – vice offensive.9  Because 
of the difficulties posed by urbanized asymmetric warfare and ISIL’s pervasive use of human 
shields, an Operation expected to last weeks, instead took months. Approximately 700 Libyan 
pro-government fighters, 2,000 ISIL members, and anywhere from 11 to 75 civilians died in 
Sirte between May and December 2016.10  
Sirte is just one example of the atrocities perpetrated by insurgents against civilian 
populations.11 Since it appeared in 2014, ISIL alone is believed to have inspired or directed 
over 175 attacks in more than two dozen countries, killing in excess of 2,300 innocent 
civilians.12 And while the Islamic State’s brutality knowns no bounds, other insurgents are 
similarly destructive to the civilian populace, including: Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, the Taliban, 
                                                          
6 Tony Bertuca, Libya Effort Named ‘Operation Odyssey Lightning, INSIDE DEFENSE, Aug. 2, 2016, 
https://insidedefense.com/insider/libya-effort-named-operation-odyssey-lightning. 
7 Senior Airman Christian Clausen, Providing Freedom from Terror: RPA’s Help Reclaim Sirte, AIR 
COMBAT COMMAND, Aug. 25, 2015, https://www.acc.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/1265247/providing-freedom-from-terror-rpas-help-reclaim-sirte/.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Missy Ryan, Air War in Post-Revolution Libya Has Left at Least 230 Civilians Dead, Report Finds, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Jun. 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/air-war-in-
post-revolution-libya-has-left-at-least-230-civilians-dead-report-finds/2018/06/19/66aae102-73d5-11e8-
b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?utm_term=.2e64e799a219 (“U.S. Africa Command has said its operations 
have caused no confirmed civilian casualties in Libya during that period, but Airwars and New America 
assessed they probably resulted in 11 to 75 noncombatant deaths”).  
11 While the terms insurgent, terrorist, and rebel usually designate different political objectives, ideology, or 
tactics, in general all three connote non-State actors that seek to overthrow, weaken, or extract concessions 
from State actors. For purposes of this paper the term insurgent(s) will be used to denote all three. See Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross & Jacob Zenn, Terrorists Insurgents, Something Else? Clarifying and Classifying the 
“Generational Challenge,” LAWFARE, Jan. 15, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrorists-insurgents-
something-else-clarifying-and-classifying-generational-challenge.  
12 Pamela Quanrud, The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS: A Success Story, Jan./Feb. 2018, FOREIGN SERVICE 






Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
among others.13 
Although Sirte remains in rubble, Operation Odyssey Lightning is considered a 
success. It stopped the expansion of ISIL in the Sahel and is assessed to have resulted in very 
few civilian casualties.14 Sirte is indicative that in today’s wars States go to great lengths to 
avoid killing civilians. They use advanced technology, rely on a multitude of intelligence, and 
program munitions to minimize collateral damage. However, just like in Sirte, sometimes 
civilians are killed. For States complying with international humanitarian law (IHL), civilians 
are never the direct target of an attack but an unfortunate consequence of the reality of war. 
Although every loss of an innocent life is devastating, the law of armed conflict expressly 
permits collateral damage so long as it is not expected to be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage. This is the core principle of proportionality.   
However, despite IHL’s allowance for civilian casualties, society believes that killing 
one civilian is one too many. That it is a natural flaw in the targeting process. There is no 
societal tolerance for civilian casualties. This has led to the development of a new norm of 
stricter targeting parameters than the law of war dictates. The United States for instance, has 
put a premium on avoiding civilian casualties using artificially imposed non-combatant 
casualty cutoff values (NCVs).15  NCVs predetermine the number of civilians – oftentimes zero 
– that can be considered collateral damage, even if their death would legally comply with the 
law of armed conflict.   
                                                          
13 See, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, 2018, 
http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/terrorism-index/ [hereinafter GTI 2018]. 
14 Peter Bergen & Alyssa Sims, Seven Years After Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake,’ Libya Killing is Rampant, CNN, 
Jun. 20, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/20/opinions/libya-chaos-civilian-deaths-bergen-
sims/index.html. See also, Ryan, supra note 10 (While the U.S. reports zero civilian casualties, other entities 
indicate anywhere from 11 to 75).   
15 Scott Graham, The Non-Combatant Casualty Cut-Off Value: Assessment of a Novel Targeting Technique 






This paper examines the development of this new normative framework surrounding 
proportionality and the inherent but unanticipated dangers associated with the continued 
application of targeting restrictions. In no way do I mean to suggest that the approaches taken 
by the U.S. and other States are not inherently ethically sound and morally imperative, in fact 
I applaud their effort to avoid civilian casualties at all costs. International humanitarian law 
compounded by the international community’s aversion to killing civilians demands it. 
However, this paper examines the inherent danger in a new normative framework proscribing 
civilian casualties; what can and will ultimately transpire if State policies become too 
restrictive. I begin my argument, in Part II, with a discussion of IHL focusing on jus in bello 
and modern day asymmetric warfare. Proceed in Part III to an analysis of State policies 
restricting targeting and the impetus behind their development. And in Part IV turn to heart of 
the matter, the unintended consequences of these restrictive regimes.   
The dangers of restrictive targeting regimes stem from the modern day nature of 
conflict – asymmetric and urbanized. Asymmetric conflicts present unique strategic, tactical, 
and moral challenges for States. Insurgents have developed a new combat doctrine enshrining 
the concept of fighting from within urban areas and using civilians as human shields.16 
Restrictive proportionality regimes immunize areas saturated with civilians from attack, 
countenancing insurgents to continue brutalizing civilian populations under their control. For 
as Laurie Blank cautions:  
[I]f the bare fact of civilian casualties were to become the measure of whether 
the overall use of force in self-defense is lawful, the international legal 
framework governing the use of force in self-defense would be undermined. 
Any military operation causing civilian casualties would then be considered 
                                                          
16 Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a 
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., 93, 126 (2011), see also, Michael N. Schmitt, 
Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. SERIES U.S. NAVAL WAR 






unlawful, even if a valid exercise of self-defense, emasculating state options 
for protecting their own civilians against attack. 
Not only does it emasculate State options for protecting their own civilians, but also 
undermines the global community’s ability to protect civilians in States with less robust 
defense mechanisms.  
II. International Humanitarian Law and Asymmetric Warfare 
A party’s decision to use force, jus ad bellum, is irrelevant to the requirement to comply 
with international humanitarian law during armed conflict. Thus we will focus on conduct 
during war, jus in bello, for purposes of this paper.17 Jus in bello is synonymous with 
international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and the law of war. IHL is applicable 
to both international and non-international armed conflicts, without regard to whether those 
fighting are State military forces or non-state armed groups.18  
In an ongoing effort to codify the international customs of warfare, Protocols I and II 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were opened for signature in 1977.19 The Additional Protocols 
                                                          
17 Jenny Martinez & Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Relationship Between Jus in Bellow and Jus ad Bellum: 
An “Orthodox” View, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF. INT’L L. ANN.  MEETING, 109-112 (2006).  
18 Humanitarian Law, International, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, last 
updated Dec. 2015, http://opil.ouplaw.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e488?rskey=aFAp3l&result=1&prd=EPIL [hereinafter MAX PLANCK IHL]. See also, What are Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello? INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-
bellum-and-jus-bello-0 (last visited May 2, 2019). See also, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman (Case No. 
SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), Decision on preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child 
Recruitment), Decision of May 31, 2004, para. 22., retrieved from https://sierralii.org/sl/judgment/special-
court/2004/18 (Appellate Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court holding that “it is well settled that all 
parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, 
even though only states may become parties to international treaties.”). 
19 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
arts. 51-52 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, Part IV [hereinafter Protocol II]. See also, Michael J. Matheson, 
Session I; The United States’ Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 420 (1987) (Although the 






(hereinafter AP I and AP II) further limited parties’ choice of means and methods of warfare 
by focusing on civilian protection.20 The Protocols codify the four fundamental principles of 
IHL: distinction, military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality.21 Underlying 
all four of these principles is the admonishment that the conduct of war is not without its limits 
and that protecting civilians is of the utmost import.22 States are bound by IHL regardless of 
the enemy they combat. This is particularly important in today’s conflicts, where insurgents 
are apt to reject the entire premise of IHL. After a short discussion on military necessity, 
unnecessary suffering (humanity), and distinction, the focus will shift to proportionality and 
the duty to protect civilians under IHL.  
The principle of military necessity requires forces to engage in only those acts 
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective, dictating that armed force is only just 
when required to repel a threat. Part and parcel to military necessity is whether the target of the 
attack is a valid military objective. Article 52 of AP I describes military objectives as “… those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”23 The principle of 
                                                          
20 While AP I focuses on international armed conflicts (IACs) and AP II on non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs), according to the ICRC gaps in the regulation of the conduct of hostilities in Additional Protocol II 
have largely been filled through State practice, which has led to the creation of rules parallel to those in 
Additional Protocol I, but applicable as customary law to NIACs vice required by Treaty. The IHL Database 
on Customary IHL catalogues these 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law. All citations to 
API in this documents are reflective of customary international law and thus parties to a conflict (regardless 
of NIAC are IAC) are bound). See IHL Database on Customary IHL available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1. The IHL Database on Customary IHL catalogues the 161 rules 
of customary international humanitarian law. All citations to API in this documents are reflective of 
customary international law and thus parties to a conflict (regardless of NIAC are IAC) are bound). 
21 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR, 250-
285 (2010). 
22 Protocol I, supra note 19 at 30 (reading that “In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict 
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”) 






military necessity legally justifies attacks against targets that are valid military objectives 
because such attacks are critical to securing the swift submission of the enemy. 
The principle of unnecessary suffering, also referred to as humanity, stems from the 
Hague Convention’s restrictions against using weapons to cause suffering or injury manifestly 
disproportionate to the military advantage realized by the use of a weapon for legitimate 
military purposes. It was formally codified in AP I, providing, “[i]t is prohibited to employ 
weapons and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.”24 It is a norm aimed at protecting combatants. The International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996, counts this provision 
among the “intransgressible principles of international customary law.”25 
We now turn to distinction and proportionality, the two principles dedicated to 
protecting civilians. The principle of distinction is the bedrock of the law regulating the conduct 
of hostilities.26 It requires parties to a conflict to distinguish at all times between combatants 
and civilians. Civilians and civilian objects may not be attacked and operations may only be 
directed against military objectives.27 AP I, art. 48 mandates that “…[p]arties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.”28 Art. 51 reiterates the premise that “[t]he civilian population as 
such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack,” 29 and adds on that “[a]cts 
                                                          
24 Protocol I art. 35(2), supra note 19, at 30. 
25 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 I.C.J. at 35, ¶ 79 (July 8, 
1996).  
26 MAX PLANCK IHL, supra note 18.  
27 Id.   
28 Protocol I, supra note 19, at 36 (art. 48).  






or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are [also] prohibited.”30 
The principle of distinction imposes obligations on both sides of the conflict, 
prohibiting intentional attacks on civilians. It does not however preclude all harm to civilians. 
Distinction addresses only the deliberate targeting of civilians and not incidental harm. This 
understanding was made explicit by numerous States in their ratification of API.31 The 
allowance for incidental harm under IHL stems from the principle of proportionality, which is 
the principle most relevant to today’s restrictive targeting regimes and will be discussed in-
depth.  
Pursuant to the principle of proportionality, parties to a conflict have a duty to not only 
refrain from attacking civilians deliberately, but also must make extensive efforts to minimize 
the incidental harm on civilian populations. Proportionality therefore requires that combatants 
use only the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish their military objectives. As 
reflected in AP I, the principle prohibits attacks “…which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”32  
In providing that attacks against valid military targets are permissible so long as civilian 
deaths are not excessive to the military advantage gained, the principle implies that some 
                                                          
30 Id.  
31 Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand and the United Kingdom all expressly stated upon 
ratification that Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I was neither intended to address, nor did it address, the 
question of incidental or collateral damage resulting from an attack directed at a military objective.  See 
PRACTICE (ch. 2) in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L., 2, ¶¶86-91 
(2005).  






collateral damage is inevitable.33 This means that the mere fact of civilian casualties, even in 
significant numbers, does not in and of itself establish a violation of international law. While 
this may sound indelicate, the fact remains that under IHL civilians can be killed and injured 
legitimately. Kenneth Watkin, the Canadian Judge Advocate General explained, “although 
civilians are not to be directly made the object of an attack, humanitarian law accepts that they 
may be killed or civilian property may be damaged as a result of an attack on a military 
objective.” 34  
There is however, an inherent difficulty to assessing proportionality. As Professor 
Bruce Cronin reminds us, “[p]roportionality is the most difficult of the four principles to assess 
in practice since it requires balancing two incompatible values, civilian casualties and military 
advantage, both of which require subjective evaluations.”35 It is the manifestation of the 
delicate balance between defeating the enemy while mitigating civilian suffering.36 In their 
review of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombing campaign in the former 
Yugoslavia, the Committee established to review the campaign articulated the tensions 
inherent in proportionality assessments: 
The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not it 
exists but what it means and how it is to be applied.  It is relatively simple to 
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate 
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects. … Unfortunately, most 
applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut.  It is 
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than 
                                                          
33 Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision Warfare, 37 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 462 (2004). 
34 Kenneth Watkin, Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules, 8 Y.B. OF INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 9 (2005).  
35 Bruce Cronin, Reckless Endangerment Warfare: Civilian Casualties and the Collateral Damage Exception 
in International Humanitarian Law, 50(2) J. OF PEACE RESEARCH, 175, 176-177 (March 2013). 
36 Kenneth Anderson, Laurie Blank Follow-up on Gaza, Proportionality, and the Law of War, THE 








it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is 
often between unlike quantities and values.37   
Additionally, while, AP I attests that civilian losses may not be “excessive” there is no 
clear cut guidance for what constitutes excessiveness. 38  As Luis Morena-Ocampo articulated, 
while Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: 
Under international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute, the death of 
civilians during an armed conflict, no matter how grave and regrettable, does 
not in itself constitute a war crime.  International humanitarian law and the 
Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against 
military objectives when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries will 
occur.39   
Because this balancing is so fundamentally difficult, IHL mandates the need to assess 
proportionality from the standpoint of a what was known at the time of the strike using the 
‘reasonable’ person standard. Per the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, “…it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the 
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to 
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.” 40    
Yoram Dinstein cautions that society, particularly the media, is apt to misconstrue the 
presence of civilian casualties as violations of international humanitarian law:   
It is frequently glossed over (especially in the media) that LOAC takes some 
collateral damage to enemy civilians virtually for granted as an inescapable 
consequence of attacks against lawful targets. Such damage is the case owing 
to the simple fact that lawful targets cannot be sterilized: some civilians and 
civilian objects will almost always be in proximity to combatants and military 
objectives. Hence a modicum of collateral damage to civilians cannot 
                                                          
37 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, LEGACY WEBSITE OF THE ICTY ¶ 48, 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/final-report-prosecutor-committee-established-review-nato-bombing-
campaign-against-federal [hereinafter NATO Bombing]. 
38 Protocol I, supra note 19, at 38 (art. 51(5)(b)).  
39 Cronin, supra note 35, at 177.  
40 Prosecutor v. Stanilav Galic (Appeal Judgement), IT-98-29-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Nov. 30, 2006, ¶ 59, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-
acjud061130.pdf; Case No. STL-11-01/I Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative 






possibility be avoided unless a battle rages in the middle of the ocean or the 
desert (where no civilians or civilian objects are within range of the contact 
zone in which the belligerent parties are conducting attacks against each other).  
Far from imposing an all-embracing prohibition on collateral damage to enemy 
civilians and civilian objects, LOAC expressly permits it as long as (in the 
words of Additional Protocol I) it is not expected to be “excessive”, compared 
to the military advantage anticipated. This is the core of the principle of 
proportionality (the word “proportionality” itself is not mentioned as such in 
the Protocol). And “excessive”—we have to keep reminding ourselves—is not 
synonymous with “extensive.” Extensive civilian casualties (and damage to 
civilian objects), even when plainly expected, may be perfectly lawful when 
reasonably determined to be nonexcessive (on the basis of the information at 
hand at the time of action) once weighed against the military advantage 
anticipated.41 
His words are an admonishment that civilian casualties, even when extensive, are not 
automatically indicative of war crimes.  
While, the principles of distinction and proportionality are both negative obligations of 
States to protect civilians, they are only part of the full legal regime. Parties to a conflict also 
have positive obligations to protect civilian populations. These include prohibiting collocation 
with civilian populations and the use of human shields. Article 51(7) of AP I42 is clear in that: 
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians 
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks 
or to shield, favour [sic] or impede military operations. The Parties to the 
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield military operations.43 
Additionally, necessary precautions require parties to take care to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects.44 A requirement of customary international law 
frequently ignored by insurgents are those of Article 58 of AP I, “…endeavour [sic] to remove 
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the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the 
vicinity of military objectives” 45 and “avoid locating military objective within or near densely 
populated areas.”46 These mandates however, are often ignored during modern day asymmetric 
warfare.   
While the media often treats asymmetric warfare as something novel, this is a 
misconception; it has been prevalent in recent decades.47 As the modern battlefield moves to 
urban areas, the natural consequence is expanded civilian involvement in hostilities. This 
places increasing obligations on the parties to minimize harm to civilians, as IHL dictates. But 
the reality is that today, asymmetric warfare does not necessarily connote the traditional view 
that one party is military stronger than the other. Instead it has evolved into an indication that 
one party is observant of IHL while the other party is not.48 In modern conflicts insurgents 
murder civilians, collocate with civilian populations, and use civilians as shields with alarming 
regularity.49   
In addition to the abhorrent practice of directly targeting civilians and using civilians 
as shields, modern day asymmetric warfare is imbued with the utilization of lawfare. Maj. Gen. 
Charles Dunlap, Jr., USAF (Ret.) introduced the term “lawfare” to describe the use of law as a 
weapon of war. In Dunlap’s words it is “the exploitation of real, perceived, or even orchestrated 
incidents of law-of-war violations being employed as an unconventional means of confronting” 
a superior military power.50 According to the Lawfare Project, it is the “negative manipulation 
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of international and national human rights laws to accomplish purposes other than, or contrary 
to, those for which they were originally enacted.”51   
In what became a consistent execution of lawfare, the Taliban systematically inflated 
civilian casualties to combat the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan.52 A report obtained from 
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence indicated that media outlets would report using the 
inflated casualty numbers bringing condemnation upon Coalition efforts;“[t]he Taliban is 
engaged in a deliberate policy of disinformation in an attempt to undermine support for the 
allied attacks on the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”53 THE GUARDIAN reported that “Pentagon officials 
are dismayed by the extent of Taliban disinformation because of its impact on the battle for 
‘hearts and mind’ being fought in the Middle East.”54 
Insurgents are increasingly pursing campaigns of lawfare to undermine their State 
adversaries. Professor John Murphy highlights the irony, “…[insurgents] such as al-Qaeda 
have enjoyed considerable success in utilizing “lawfare” as a strategy against the U.S. and its 
allies, even as they regularly and unapologetically engage in methods of warfare that clearly 
violate the law of armed conflict.55 As Michael Gross reflects in THE ETHICS OF INSURGENCY, 
the catchphrase “we fight by the rules, but they don’t - is nearly axiomatic.”56   
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III. State Proscriptions on the Use of Force 
As discussed, civilian deaths, even when considerable, do not automatically mean there 
have been violations of IHL. In particular, the principles of distinction and proportionality are 
only violated when civilians are the intended target, or the harm to civilians is excessive in 
relation to the anticipated military advantage. However, despite the actual requirement under 
IHL, society has become increasingly intolerant of civilian casualties. Now even one civilian 
casualty is one too many. As Professor Samuel Moyn underscores, “the ultimate worry is not 
that the number of civilians who dies it too high; it is that any civilians die at all.”57 This has 
led States to institute policies restricting targeting; creating a new norm of proportionality, 
stricter than the law of war dictates. First a look at these new policies, followed by an 
assessment of the impetus behind their creation.   
In the United States there are substantial policy controls for the conduct of military 
operations to minimize civilian casualties.58 In the last two decades, the Bush, Obama, and 
Trump Administrations have all put a premium on avoiding civilian casualties, instituting 
policies to minimize collateral damage via prescriptive battlefield rules of engagement. Per 
Professor Nathan Canestaro, President Bush imposed targeting restrictions “to assuage 
concerns in the Muslim world about the conduct of war and combat the perception that the 
campaign was directed against island as a whole.”59 The process to nominate and approve 
targets was extremely labor intensive and required vetting by Department of Defense lawyers.  
It was also during the Bush era that reliance on precision guided munitions became the norm.60  
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In the early days of the Obama presidency, the Tactical Directives for operations in 
Afghanistan articulated a goal of zero civilian casualties even if a hindrance to U.S. 
operations.61  As the head of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2010, General John Allen messaged, 
“my intent is to eliminate…civilian casualties” clearly exceeding the requirement imposed by 
IHL.62 President Obama went even a step further, issuing restrictions on the use of force outside 
of areas of active hostilities, such as Somalia and Yemen.63 The PRESIDENTIAL POLICY 
GUIDANCE (PPG) limited civilian casualties by setting the threshold at zero, requiring that 
“…before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilian can be killed or 
injured – the highest standard we can set.” 64 Contemporaneously to the issuance of the PPG, 
President Obama issued an executive order prioritizing civilian protection and documenting 
best practices to reduce their likelihood.65  Even after the transition from the Obama to Trump 
Administration, the policy of “near certainty” that no civilians would be injured or killed 
remained.66    
Senior U.S. officials continue to administer policies that underscore the protection of 
civilians.67 The Non-Combatant Casualty Cut-Off Value (NCV) is the most recent, and current, 
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policy imposing targeting restrictions. While instituted during the Obama years it remains a 
policy of the Trump Administration.68 The NCV is a predetermined restriction on 
proportionally, limiting the acceptable number of civilian casualties by imposing an artificial 
ceiling on how many civilians can be killed as collateral damage.69 If a strike is expected to 
yield civilian casualties greater than the NCV, it must be aborted.70 Today, NCVs are tailored 
for specific high value targets and areas of operation. They can even be tied to the requirement 
to use particular munitions and weapons systems.71 
 A policy of zero civilian casualties was in place for much of the ISIL campaign. This 
ultimately resulted in over 75 percent of strikes being called off due to insupportable risks to 
civilians.72 Even when the NCV was increased, meaning targeting restrictions were relaxed, 
for various phases of the campaign, the Trump Administration’s executive order emphasized 
that U.S. policies regarding civilians populations were “more protective than the requirements 
of the law of armed conflict...”73 General Joseph Votel, the Commander of U.S. Central 
Command, also testified before congress that “…[the U.S. has] not relaxed the rules of 
engagement,” in Iraq and Syria.74  According to Professor Sam Moyn “it’s clear that the U.S. 
has the most robust CIVCAS [civilian casualty] avoidance policy and process in the world (and 
in history).”75 
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While, as Moyn notes, the U.S.’ policy may be the most robust, other States have also 
adopted policies restricting proportionality. In Israel there are policies requiring zero civilian 
casualties. These targeting restrictions, similar to the U.S., are very much operation and 
geography specific.76 During all combat operations, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) takes 
extensive steps to weigh the risk of civilian harm. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs release of 
The Operation in Gaza: Factual and Legal Aspects, they underscore that on numerous 
occasions, the IDF called off a strikes against valid military objectives to avoid the possibility 
of civilian harm, even when the attacks would have been proportionate and complied with 
IHL.77     
   Australia also operates under strict rules of engagement with the goal of preventing 
civilian casualties. While unwilling to release their rules of engagement publically, during 
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Australian officials maintained that their rules of 
engagement were more stringent than those of the United States.78 Publically stating that “[o]ur 
members operate under strict Rules of Engagement which are specifically designed to avoid 
civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure…”79 Supporting this are the accounts 
of Australian FA/18 pilots who refused to execute strikes on over 40 missions, despite 
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Coalition approval, because of national caveats to the Coalition’s rules of engagement and 
concerns about resulting civilian casualties.80 
 Germany, as a member of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, also had “insanely restrictive rules of engagement.”81 They operated in an entirely 
defensive manner and were unable to offensively engage targets. Even later on in the conflict 
when revised rules of engagement were issued, Germans were still prohibited from engaging 
the enemy in anything but self-defense.82 Germans operated under much stricter rules of 
engagement than other NATO-led forces.   
 Denmark, as one of a handful of States participating in airstrikes against ISIL mandated 
precautions to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. They did this by placing targeting 
restrictions in their Tactical Directive.83 These policies ultimately constrained the flexibility 
inherent in the principle of proportionality, leading to target execution being more restrictive 
than required by IHL.84    
In addition to individual national caveats restricting proportionality, Coalitions as a 
whole also proscribe civilian casualties. NATO restricted targeting in Afghanistan in an 
attempt to limit civilian deaths by prohibiting the use of certain munitions.85 The Counter-ISIL 
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Coalition also frequently exercised restraint from strikes likely to result in civilian casualties.86  
A Coalition spokesman noted “our goal has always been for zero civilian casualties...”87  
 The selection of States discussed above are the restrictive targeting regimes found in 
open source outlets. Most State specific rules of engagement are classified and therefore not 
releasable to the public. While the paper mentions only a small subset of States and Coalitions 
engaged in military action around the world, they are indicative of the increasing normalcy of 
policies aimed at reducing civilian casualties via restrictive targeting regimes. Under such 
regimes, the classic proportionality assessment of IHL is no longer required. These new 
policies mandate a ceiling on civilian casualties authorizing target engagement only if the 
collateral damage is equal to or less than the prescribed limit. While proponents of NCVs or 
other restrictive proportionality regimes argue they are a strategically sound measure to control 
target engagement and mitigate civilian casualties, others assess that these policies restrict 
warfighters ability to effectively engage the enemy.88 Under restrictive targeting regimes, even 
when engagement is perfectly legal under IHL, policy constraints may preclude the strike. 
What is driving the normalization of restrictive targeting regimes and why are they 
becoming increasingly prevalent? It is simple really - politics. Or more elegantly articulated, 
these restrictions are driven by political fear of the society’s reaction to civilian casualties.89 
As concerns about civilian casualties proliferate, State imposed targeting restrictions assuage 
some of the concerns by mollifying citizenry and preventing media censure. 
As Winston Churchill once said, “[a] politician needs the ability to foretell what is 
going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year. And have the ability 
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afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen.”90 Today civilian casualties are seen as evidence 
of military failure. Restrictive targeting policies allow States to undercut the eventual 
condemnation that arises when strikes unintentionally result in collateral damage. These new 
targeting regimes allow States to counter the narrative by broadcasting that States’ policies 
went above and beyond that required by IHL.91  
If war is an instrument of policy, then so too are battlefield rules of engagement.92 And 
the current political tool of choice are the required use of NCVs and other restrictive targeting 
directives for the conduct of war. These new regimes reflect political reality just as much as 
they do legal requirements. It is clear that political fear drives restrictive targeting regimes, but 
to truly understand this phenomenon it is critical to examine what influences that fear. Political 
fear has three main drivers: (1) domestic public opinion; (2) concerns about diplomatic 
relations; and, (3) the CNN effect. 
Politicians are driven to respond to their constituencies’ opinions in order to maintain 
their political seat come election day. Therefore, domestic public opinion on the relative 
success or failure of an operation can influence policy. While the commencement of hostilities 
typically enjoys domestic support, this support decays over time.93 To politicians, gaining and 
maintaining domestic support is critical. Denmark for instance, during the campaign against 
ISIL, created policies ensuring that everything feasible would be done in order to keep civilian 
casualties to a minimum. A study of these policies concluded that “the protection of civilians 
objective was a sub-objective amended for political legitimizing purposes,” 94 and that a 
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restrictive targeting regime was incorporated for “political and strategic reasons to secure 
Danish political imperatives.”95 This was particularly prudent of Danish politicians since 
studies indicate a relationship between domestic support for the use of force and collateral 
damage, with public support decreasing as the collateral consequences of war rise.96   
Paul Bernstein’s study on the impact of public opinion on domestic policy indicates 
that, “[t]he more salient an issue is to the public, the stronger the relationship between public 
opinion and policy.”97 Civilian casualties are a particularly salient issue in contemporary 
society as indicated by its extensive media coverage. In the United States, attacks that risk 
killing civilians are opposed by more than 52% of the public.98  Another study found that across 
both the U.S. and the United Kingdom that support for military action was lower when the 
civilian death toll – projected or actual – was higher.99 Even during NATO’s involvement in 
Kosovo, a Post-ABC News Poll found that "disapproval of the air war increased by 21 
percentage points …  among Americans highly concerned about civilians being hurt or killed 
by the NATO attacks.”100 
Another reason for increased public censure on military action resulting in civilian 
casualties can be credited to Human Rights Organizations (HROs). HROs have become major 
players in the political arena, exercising their influence through political advocacy and public 
discourse.101 Their extensive resources provide placement and access to senior politicians 
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allowing them to shape narratives and drive policy.102 As conflicts are inevitable, HROs will 
continue to take a critical eye to State military action and influence policies related to military 
action.   
Killing civilians, even if legally justified, can also erode international support and 
affect foreign policy.103 In a letter sent to then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, national 
security experts highlighted that “[e]ven small numbers of unintentional civilian deaths or 
injuries…can cause partners and allies to reduce operational collaboration, withdraw consent, 
and limit intelligence-sharing; increasing violence from militant groups; and foster distrust 
among local populations that are crucial to accomplishing the mission.”104 This is particularly 
true in asymmetric conflicts that have a natural political element built in – winning the hearts 
and minds of the local populace.   
Destroying the lives and property of civilians is self-defeating when their protection is 
the ultimate priority.105 Even when unintentional collateral, civilian casualties present a 
strategic problem potentially driving the local populace to support the insurgents. Targeting 
restrictions are aimed not only at reducing civilian casualties but also fomenting local 
support.106 The United States’ use of NCVs in Afghanistan is demonstrative of this very issue. 
Since civilian casualties were considered a liability to strategic efforts, an NCV of zero was 
imposed.107 The 2010 Tactical Directive admonished that “[e]very Afghani civilian death 
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diminishes our cause.”108 Even at United States Central Command’s Headquarters, officials 
were allegedly “deathly afraid” of collateral damage because of the political ramifications to 
the entire campaign.109 As civilian casualties have increased, animosity from the local populace 
and consternation from international partners have shaped State targeting policies. 
Related to domestic public opinion and foreign policy, the advent of persistent global 
news coverage also influences policy. This is commonly referred to as the CNN Effect, a term 
first used during the Gulf War.110 The CNN Effect is seen as policy forcing; the media does 
not create policies, instead they direct their creation.111 As Colin Powell observed ‘‘[l]ive 
television coverage does not change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the 
policy is made.’’112 This is accomplished by focused broadcasting. In recent years that focus 
has been on civilian deaths and other collateral damage around the world.113 Civilian casualties 
are particularly newsworthy because violence and terror glue people to the television.114  
Instantaneous news coverage means immediate public awareness and scrutiny of 
military operations, making the media an important policy influencer in conflicts around the 
globe.115 As President Barak Obama stated, “[i]n our digital age, a single image from the 
battlefield of troops falling short of their standards can go viral and endanger our forces and 
undermine our efforts to achieve security and peace.116 U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
Madeline Albright similarly offered, “[a]ggression and atrocities are beamed into our living 
rooms and cars with astonishing immediacy. No civilized human being can learn of these horrid 
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acts occurring on a daily basis and stand aloof from them.”117 It therefore makes sense that the 
advancement of restrictive targeting regimes is in part due to the CNN effect and the media’s 
penchant for broadcasting civilian casualties.118  
Insurgents also use the media to their strategic advantage in the conduct of information 
operations as part of their lawfare campaigns. Now the adversaries use of media can similarly 
influence policies. Even when the coverage is subsequently revealed to have been nothing more 
than information warfare, it may be too late. After the Goldstone Report119 was revealed to 
have been based on false information, Jeffrey Goldberg, the Editor-in-Chief of THE ATLANTIC 
commented, “[w]ell, I’m glad he’s cleared that up. Unfortunately, it is somewhat difficult to 
retract a blood libel, once it has been broadcast across the world.”120 The media’s coverage of 
lawfare is becoming ubiquitous, adding an additional level of pressure for politicians.121  
While noble and driven in part by ethical considerations, it is clear that targeting 
restrictions are not entirely altruistic. Political concerns are the predominate factor and the 
commitment to minimize collateral damage has been shaped by political fear. It is a fear of 
alienating constituencies, the international community, and media censure. This fear has led 
States to adopt restrictive targeting regimes. Given the importance that society ascribes to 
minimizing civilian casualties, it is no wonder that States make efforts to avoid collateral 
damage. But while these policies may be ethically and morally sound, there are oft forgotten 
unintended consequences.    
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IV. Unintended Consequences 
The global community aspires to a utopian world of zero civilian casualties.  
Unfortunately, this is both a dangerous and unrealistic expectation. While targeting restrictions 
are morally and politically enticing, there are four primary unintended consequences. They are: 
(1) increased brutality against civilians; (2) amplified civilian endangerment; (3) unrealistic 
expectations of a perfect war; and, (4) the development of a new norm of proportionality under 
customary international law (CIL).  
It is a strange logic to limit lethal force against insurgents while allowing them to 
continue endangering civilian populations. Yet that is exactly what happens with restrictive 
targeting regimes. Due to the political ramifications of civilian casualties, insurgents are rarely 
engaged with fully military force.122 While States fight by the rules of IHL, insurgents do not, 
and violence against civilians is one of many tactics they use as a means of altering the strategic 
landscape.123 Proscriptions on State action provide insurgents with increased freedom of 
maneuver to carry out brutal attacks on civilian populations. Thus, State imposed targeting 
restrictions unintentionally result in continued harm to civilians.124 
In the last few decades, insurgents have become prodigious killers, perpetrating suicide 
attacks and car bombings; killing thousands of civilians. As Professor Benjamin Valentino 
explains, “[c]ivilians are not merely bystanders to armed conflict; they play a central, if often 
involuntary, role as the underwriters of war’s material, financial, and human requisites. 
Sometimes they become the object of war itself.”125 Violence against civilians has become a 
common part of asymmetric warfare. As Wickham-Crowley observed, “terror against civilians 
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is apparently a far more regular, even ‘natural,’ concomitant of modern guerilla warfare than 
of modern conventional warfare.”126  
The Islamic State alone has killed thousands of innocents. Their malicious actions 
against civilians are universally condemned. The UN Security Council in Resolution 2249 
(2015) “unequivocally condemn[ed]” the gross, systematic and widespread abuse of human 
rights and violations of humanitarian law perpetuated by ISIL, calling their actions against 
civilians and civilian infrastructure “barbaric.”127 The international community became 
regrettably familiar with an individual known as Jihadi John128 who between 2014 and 2015 
gained notoriety with the release of various videos depicting western hostages in ISIL custody. 
In the videos that reverberated around the world and caused international condemnation, Jihadi 
John joined by other members of the Islamic State, violently executed innocent civilians. These 
included humanitarian aid workers,129 journalists,130 and other innocent members of society.  
In response to the Islamic State’s brutality, the Jordanian representative to the 7565th 
meeting of the United Nations Security Council stated that ISIL “wreak[s] havoc and evil 
across the globe” and are unfaltering in “their odious intentions towards humankind in targeting 
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civilians.”131 In 2017 alone, ISIL intentionally killed more than 2,080 civilians.132 Of these, 
1572 civilian deaths and 254 attacks perpetrated against civilians occurred inside the then ISIL 
controlled city of Mosul.133  While the Islamic States’ brutality is of a level rarely seen, they 
are not alone in the intentional targeting of civilians. In 2017 the four organizations responsible 
for the most civilian deaths included not only the Islamic State, but also the Taliban, al-
Shabaab, and Boko Haram.134  
The Taliban has a long history of perpetrating crimes against civilians.135 Since 2016 
they have increasingly focused their attacks in urban areas killing thousands of innocent 
civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, “suicide attacks, including car and truck 
bombings, caused at least one-third of these casualties. Hundreds of civilians are going about 
ordinary activities – walking down the street, working in a shop, preparing food at home, or 
worshipping in a mosque – have experienced sudden and terrifying violence.”136 In January of 
2018, the Taliban conducted two egregious attacks against the civilian population in Kabul 
resulting in the deaths of well over a hundred individuals. The first on 20 January was an attack 
at the Intercontinental Hotel. The attack lasted almost 24 hours and resulted in the death of 21 
civilians.137 A week later, an ambulance bomb killed more than 103 people and injured another 
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200 when it detonated at a busy Kabul intersection.138  In 2017 alone, over 4,000 civilian 
casualties were attributed to the Taliban.139 
In Nigeria and other areas of Northwest Africa, Boko Haram, with alarming regularity 
have perpetrated attacks against civilian populations.140 In 2015, they executed a multi-day 
massacre in the town of Baga and its surrounding villages, killing upwards of 2,000 civilians.  
In 2017, over 71 percent of their attacks were targeted against civilians.141 One of these was an 
attack against a refugee camp in Nigeria killing over 150 innocents.142  In March of 2018, they 
attacked another displacement camp killing at least three Nigerian aid workers and abducting 
three others. The three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aid workers abducted 
in the attack were later executed.143 Since 2009, Boko Haram has killed approximately 20,000 
civilians, and their violence against civilians is on the rise.144  
In Somalia and Kenya, al-Shabaab also commonly perpetrates violence against civilian 
populations, assassinating journalists, international aid workers, and other civilians.145 In 2013, 
al-Shabaab was responsible for the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya killing 67 
civilians.146 Two years later in 2015, militants stormed the Garissa University College in 
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Garissa, Kenya holding over 700 civilians hostage, eventually murdering 148.147 Al-Shabaab 
perpetrated the deadliest attack in all of 2017 when a truck bomb detonated in central 
Mogadishu killing almost 600 civilians and injuring an additional 300.148  In total, more than 
1,400 civilians were killed by al-Shabaab in 2017.149  
70 percent of all civilian deaths perpetrated by insurgents in 2017 took place in five 
countries: Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Nigeria.150 Together, the Islamic State, the 
Taliban, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab slaughtered 10,632 civilians in 2017 alone.151 They are 
not alone; groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let), all kill civilians 
with disturbing frequency.152   
Children, in particular, suffer unspeakable atrocities in armed conflicts. In the past 
decade, according to one estimate, one out of every six children is affected by conflict.153 
Children are murdered, tortured and raped, oftentimes simply for entertainment. Thousands of 
children have also been kidnapped. In 2014 Boko Haram infamously kidnapped 276 female 
students in Nigeria, highlighting their deliberate targeting of children.154 The group continues 
to abduct children on regular basis. These children are forced to become child brides, subjected 
to domestic servitude, and with alarming frequency used to carry out suicide attacks in civilian 
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communities.155 Children are also conscripted into military service. Al-Shabaab alone recruited 
1,770 children in 2017, using threats to tribal elders and parents as a forcing mechanism.156   
Sexual violence is another ruthless weapon employed by insurgents. Sexual violence 
is used to intimidate and terrorize the civilian population.157 There have been instances where 
women and children were forced to trade sexual favors for food, shelter or physical 
protection.158 In one case, a 15-year-old boy was raped over three consecutive nights by an 
ISIL commander.159 In another a 17-year-old Yazidi girl was sexually abused by multiple ISIL 
members before being forced to manufacture bombs.160 Boko Haram alone abducted, raped, or 
forcibly married 116 girls and nine boys in 2017.161 Unfortunately, these are common accounts 
since over 900 cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence against children were verified 
by the United Nations in 2017.162  
As the numbers and accounts demonstrate, insurgents commit brutal acts of violence 
against civilians. Targeting restrictions only make is easier for insurgents to continue their 
carnage.163 When insurgents’ freedom of maneuver goes unchecked, it allows them to continue 
inflicting egregious harm against civilian populations.164 As Laura Seligman, FOREIGN 
POLICY’S Pentagon correspondent, writes, “[p]lacing too much emphasis on avoiding collateral 
damage can be dangerous; as States concern themselves on perfectly executing targets to an 
extent that well exceeds the requirements of the law of armed conflict, insurgents are busy 
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murdering innocent civilians.”165 Focusing on the Islamic State, Seligman rhetorically asks 
“[w]hat is the logic of a policy that limits the application of force to get rid of the evil that is 
the Islamic State while allowing them to kill innocent men, women and children?"166    
Maj. Gen. Dunlap refers to this as the moral hazard of inaction. He cautions that “these 
more-than-what-the-law requires policies are getting civilians killed.”167 States impose 
targeting restrictions in order to save civilian lives. Meanwhile, the insurgents that were spared 
live on to terrorize innocent civilians. Left unrestricted, innocent civilians will continue to be 
aggressed. Imagine if the U.S./Libyan coalition had not liberated Sirte from ISIL control, 
residents would have continued to be conscripted, slaughtered, and used as sex slaves, the local 
populace would still be living in ‘hell.’ Dunlap is correct that policies restricting the use of 
force against insurgents are “self-defeating at best, and counterproductive at worst.”168 As 
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said, the cost of inaction against IS “would be to say 
to these butchers, ‘Go ahead, you have a free pass.’ We won’t accept that.”169 The unfortunate 
consequence of restricted targeting regimes is that when insurgents are not killed, civilians face 
even greater harm.   
In addition to the outright physical harm perpetrated by insurgents, restrictive targeting 
regimes unintentionally increase civilian endangerment. These regimes encourage insurgents 
to commingle with civilian populations, use humans as shields, and utilize lawfare to combat 
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State military superiority. How this develops can be seen in the narrative of the al-Amiriyah 
Bunker strike during the First Gulf War. On 13 February 1991, the United States executed an 
attack against an assessed military command and control (C2) center located in Baghdad.170 
According to military intelligence, the bunker was camouflaged, surrounded by barbed wire, 
and protected by armed guards. Unbeknownst to the U.S. at the time of the attack, civilians - 
potentially family of senior military and intelligence officials - had been admitted to the top 
floor the night prior.171 The results of the strike were catastrophic, with over 400 innocent 
civilians killed.172  
Whether the United States’ intelligence was flawed or whether the Iraqis were 
purposefully commingling military assets with civilians, or some combination of the two, is 
irrelevant for purposes of this paper. What matters is the result.  Per the White House: 
The Iraqis quickly realized that placing military assets – including tanks, 
missiles, and command-and-control facilities – close to civilians and civilian 
infrastructure could yield substantial benefits. By shielding military assets with 
civilians and civilian infrastructure, Saddam understood that coalition forces 
would either avoid attacking targets close to civilians or risk severe political 
damage from unintended civilian deaths at what would have appeared to be a 
purely military site.173 
The unintentional devastation of the al-Amiriyah attack demonstrated to Saddam Hussein that 
collocation of military assets and the use of human shields was a winning combination. If 
civilians were killed it was an even more favorable outcome, allowing him to paint the U.S. as 
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the murderer of innocents. The United States was so scarred by the images “of the charred 
bodies of children being pulled out of the ruins of the bunker,” that all future proposed strikes 
in Baghdad had to be approved by the Chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff.174  
Since the First Gulf War, warfare is even more urbanized. Insurgents, similar to 
Saddam Hussein, understand the strategic benefits of ignoring the requirements of IHL and 
commingling military assets and civilian populations. Concealment warfare has become 
commonplace, offering insurgents unique tactical and strategic advantages. Tactically, 
collocating with civilian populations makes it difficult for States to distinguish insurgents from 
civilians, increasing insurgents’ freedom of maneuver. As States become more technologically 
advanced, concealment warfare provides a significant military advantage at little to no cost. 
Thus, insurgents are frequently utilizing concealment warfare to level the playing field.175 In 
recent conflicts, commingling with civilian populations has been operationalized. It is now 
normal to see ISIL, al-Shabaab, Hamas, and others camouflaging themselves as part of civil 
society.   
While in no way meant to minimize the violence perpetrated by both sides during the 
Gaza Wars, the fact remains that Hamas deliberately launched rockets from within urban areas, 
oftentimes located near schools and other protected facilities such as mosques and hospitals.176 
As the Israeli Ministry of Defense learned during their lengthy review of the Gaza Operation: 
Many of the civilian deaths and injuries, and a significant amount of the 
damage to property during the Gaza Operation, was attributable to Hamas’ 
tactic of blending in with the civilian population and its use of, or operations 
near, protected facilities and civilian property. …[Hamas] operatives admitted, 
for example, that they frequently carried out rocket fire from schools (such as 
the Sakhnin school in the area of Abu Halima, and another school in the al-
                                                          
174 Canestaro, supra note 33, at 482.  
175 Canestaro, supra note 33, at 480. 






Amal neighbourhood [sic]), precisely because they knew that Israeli jets would 
not fire on the schools.177  
Hamas actions, though clear violations of IHL, were and continue to be a standardized practice.  
Similarly, the use of human shields has become an increasingly prevalent tactic for 
insurgents despite its prohibition under IHL. Conventionally, insurgents use shields as a form 
of immunity from military engagement, they are an easily available mechanism to exploit a 
States’ adherence to IHL. By broadcasting the presence of civilians, insurgents aim to prevent 
attacks against them; an effective tool against adversaries concerned with the public perception 
of civilian casualties. The tactic allows for a technologically weaker party to change the 
strategic landscape. Michael Gross explains, “[b]ound by international law and their own 
military ethos, state armies find themselves hamstrung when confronting [insurgents] willing 
to draw their own civilians into battle.”178  
As highlighted by Saddam’s actions in the wake of the al-Amiriyah attack and the more 
recent 2014 discovery of a Hamas handbook, insurgents now recognize that States are 
discouraged from executing attacks when there is a potential for collateral damage.179 When 
specific targeting restrictions become public, it simply incentives insurgents to forcefully use 
as many civilians as necessary to shield themselves. Insurgents are more strategic than once 
assumed, for they indubitably pay attention to State policies and exploit them.180 Maj. Gen. 
Dunlap calls this polifare, “[w]hen a warfighting entity is able to use (or exploit) policies or 
political directives that exceed what the law would dictate as effective substitutes for traditional 
military means…”181   
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When the Obama Administration declassified the Presidential Policy Guidance it 
resulted in insurgents modifying their tactics.182  Adversaries everywhere gained a tactical 
advantage by simply ensuring collocation with noncombatants due to requirement of ‘near 
certainty’ that no civilians would be injured or killed. And while State policies and rules of 
engagement are often meant to remain classified, WikiLeaks has taught us that is seldom the 
case. For instance, when asked about NCVs, a senior U.S. military official responded “we don’t 
put those numbers out” because of the possibility of exploitation by insurgents.183 However, 
shortly thereafter, the Associated Press reported that operations against the Islamic State “may 
authorize strikes where up to 10 civilians may be killed.”184  
When States’ policies are telegraphed to the enemy, it provides incentive to exploit 
these policies. According to Charles Dunlap, this explains why ISIL’s use of human shields 
has “proliferated to such an unprecedented degree.”185 In the battle to liberate Mosul, ISIL 
“encircled by Iraqi forces, herded civilians deeper into the heart of the historic city to use as 
human shields as it made its last stand.”186 It is clear that State policies unintentionally 
increased the use of civilians as shields. And while their use by ISIL reached unprecedented 
proportions, it is a tool frequently employed other insurgent groups.187 As Charles Dunlap and 
Hays Parks remind us, if States reward an enemy’s use of civilian shields by imposing targeting 
restrictions, it rewards (rather than condemns) the enemy for their illegal actions.188  
                                                          
182 Dunlap LAWFIRE, supra note 168.  
183 McDonell, supra note 107.  
184 Id.   
185 Dunlap LAWFIRE, supra note 168. 
186 Jane Arraf, More Civilians Than ISIS Fighters are Believed Killed in Mosul Battle, NPR, Dec. 19, 2017, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/12/19/570483824/more-civilians-than-isis-fighters-are-
believed-killed-in-mosul-battle.    
187 Rubinstein, supra note 16, at 96-98 (Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, among others have incorporated the use 
of human shields into their tactical plans).  






For insurgents, using human shields and commingling with civilian populations are 
easy tactical and strategic wins against States concerned with civilian casualties. If an 
insurgents goal is to live another day, deterring an attack by using civilians as shields is any 
easy way to accomplish their objective. Imposing targeting restrictions assures the continued 
use of concealment warfare and perversely increases the potential harm to civilians.189  Human 
shields have become the most pervasive problem of modern conflict and restricted targeting 
regimes will only ensure their continued use.   
Related to the use of human shields is the advent of lawfare. As briefly discussed supra, 
lawfare is the use of law as a weapon of war.190 Restricted targeting regimes result in an 
intensified resort to lawfare by insurgents in order to shift the strategic narrative. This becomes 
a necessity when insurgents can no longer exclusively rely on a magnitude of civilian casualties 
caused purely by State military action. While the prototypical use of human shields was 
deterring attacks, insurgents have now turned their use into an even more sordid affair; a 
weapon of lawfare to disrepute State action. Human shields are now being used with the 
expectation that civilians will be killed, bringing condemnation down on the States executing 
the attack.191 Instead of publicizing civilian presence to avoid attack, insurgents surreptitiously 
hide them within military facilities and discredit State operations once civilian casualties are 
revealed.  
Urban warfare is ideal for this, as the concentration of civilians and military objectives 
naturally increases the likelihood of civilian casualties.192 ISIL for instance, clandestinely 
placed civilians inside military facilities. When these civilians were inadvertently killed, 
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Dabiq193 used their deaths in an attempt discredit the coalition, characterizing the strikes as 
murder.194  A Pentagon official noted that “[w]hat you see now is not the use of civilians as 
human shields. Now, it’s something much more sinister. ISIS is smuggling civilians into 
buildings so we won’t see them, trying to bait the coalition to attack, to take advantage of the 
public outcry and deter action in the future.”195 This new approach has become a premeditated 
attempt to cause harm to civilian populations, an outright violation of the requirements under 
IHL.  
Insurgents utilize these casualties to change the strategic narrative and shift the blame 
entirely to the States executing the attack, oftentimes with success.196 As General Votel 
acknowledged, “[t]he enemy … has little regard for human life and does attempt to use civilian 
casualty allegations as a tool to hinder our operations.”197 The heightened risk of collateral 
damage can offset technological superiority, thus insurgents will increasingly exploit civilian 
casualties for their own strategic gain. As Hays Parks said the “…defender has accomplished 
his mission if he makes the attacker miss the target."198  
Lawfare also has an overt face to it. It entails more than just the secretive placement of 
civilians in military facilities. Overt tactics employed include fighting from protected facilities 
including hospitals, mosques, and schools. Israel’s Ministry of Defense assessed that: 
Hamas launched rockets from near schools, used hospitals as bases of 
operation, stored weapons in mosques, and booby-trapped entire 
neighbourhoods [sic], all in contravention of clear and specific prohibitions of 
international law. Hamas’ strategy was two-fold: (1) to take advantage of the 
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sensitivity of the IDF to civilian casualties on the Palestinian side, in an attempt 
to deter the IDF from attacking legitimate military targets; and (2) where the 
IDF did attack, to wield an excellent propaganda weapon against Israel, 
featuring civilian casualties as well as damage to homes and public institutions. 
In other words, Hamas chose to base its operations in civilian areas not in spite 
of, but because of, the likelihood of substantial harm to civilians.199   
Other insurgents employ similar tactics, purposefully endangering civilian populations.200  
Media manipulation also plays an enormous role in the execution of lawfare. Insurgents 
are eminently media savvy and are able to manipulate the narrative, highlighting State 
‘brutality’ directly to the international community using print, the internet, and social media 
platforms.201 Insurgents broadcast false messaging that State and Coalition forces intentionally 
kill innocent civilians.  By fabricating war crimes and exploiting the narrative created by 
unintentional civilian casualties, insurgents seek to undermine international support and change 
the strategic landscape.202  According to Graham, it was the Islamic State’s use of lawfare that 
eroded Canadian public support and resulted in the Canadian government withdrawing strike 
assets from Iraq in 2016.203  
Danish Karokhel, the Director of the first internationally recognized independent news 
agency in Afghanistan indicated: 
90 percent of the information that the Taliban provide to the media is false: 
when only one Afghan soldier gets killed in an attack, the insurgents call the 
media and claim that 10 foreign soldiers are killed. They are not responsible to 
anyone for their false claims and misinformation while, on the other side, the 
government and the international forces have many responsibilities and 
obligations and can’t give false information.204 
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To insurgents, any suggestion that propaganda enhances deterrence or promotes political 
volatility is an express benefit.   
 If the primary purpose of lawfare is to place the onus of indiscriminate warfare on 
States, then the unfortunate truth is that it is an effective technique. Orde F. Kittrie, in his book 
LAWFARE, writes: 
Hamas’s battlefield lawfare against Israel has proven to be one of the most 
valuable weapons in its arsenal, heavily influencing the behavior of Israel, 
other state actors, and the international community as a whole. It has led to 
Israel being condemned by much of the international community (including 
traditionally allied states) and being pressured to make concessions to Hamas. 
On the battlefield, it has required Israel to sacrifice the benefit of surprise and 
otherwise fight Hamas with one hand tied behind its back, including by 
deterring Israeli attacks against Hamas’s headquarters in Shifa Hospital and, 
on many occasions, against Hamas fighters and weapons elsewhere.205 
As the examples above reflect, modern wars fought in urban areas offer insurgents 
tremendous opportunities to use lawfare and exploit State military efforts.206 Meanwhile, States 
get no exemptions from IHL; they are expected to maintain the distinction between combatants 
and civilians even when insurgents deliberately blur the distinction.207  As Kenneth Anderson 
so eloquently summarized, “[f]acilitating insurgents exploitation of the law for its own 
defensive and propaganda purposes in this way gravely endangers the very persons the law of 
war seeks to protect—the civilians caught up in the combat zone—and thus undermines the 
essential fabric of the law of war.”208  
While it is clear that States fight by rules that insurgents do not, States’ dedication to 
reduce civilian casualties continues.209 However, these restrictions will continue to incentivize 
the practice of commingling with civilian populations, using humans shields, and utilizing 
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lawfare to combat State military dominance. With restrictive targeting regimes, insurgents have 
no incentive to comply with IHL, for doing so would be a repudiation of their entire strategy. 
As Walzer says “[i]t cannot be the case that guerillas can hug the civilian population and make 
themselves invulnerable.210 
In addition to the increased civilian endangerment stemming from restricted targeting 
regimes, these regimes also create an impractical standard of victory - one of no civilian 
casualties. Never in history has there been a perfect war. This is because war is imperfect. War 
is also chaotic. While certain consequences of war are revealed immediately, others take longer 
to be exposed. The immediate effects of war are the casualties and destruction of urban areas. 
But no less devastating are the long term effects of war, the displacement of millions, 
starvation, and resulting psychological issues. Restrictive targeting regimes set an unrealistic 
expectation for warfighters, and the global community writ large, that wars can be won without 
civilian casualties.   
Conducting warfare against an enemy in an urban environment is extraordinarily 
difficult. It is an environment that does not support a requirement for perfection. The United 
States realized this and increased the NCV for individual targets and geographic areas during 
select urban fights against the Islamic State.211 The nature of urbanized asymmetric warfare 
does not support zero civilian casualties, especially given the ubiquitous presence of civilians. 
It would have been impossible to liberate Mosul or Raqqa, or even Sirte, without inflicting a 
single civilian casualty. Casualties result from both those conducting ground offensives and 
those providing air support. The reality is that war is dangerous, and deadly. There will always 
be some risk to civilians but it is up to States to mitigate that risk as much as possible. 
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This mitigation has occurred with the advent of precision guided munitions. The U.S. 
Department of Defense defines precision guided munitions as a “guided weapon intended to 
destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage. Also called PGM, smart weapon, smart 
munition.”212 Undoubtedly, the introduction of precision weapons systems has been one of the 
most important developments in the history of warfare. Aerial bombing campaigns –  the days 
of Dresden and the Blitz - are no longer the norm. Precision-guided munitions are more 
effectively delivered on target, reducing the likelihood of civilian casualties. However, the 
ability of PGMs to minimize collateral damage has resulted in the erroneous belief that civilian 
casualties can be eliminated altogether.  
 While eliminating civilian casualties entirely is a commendable aspiration; it is 
unattainable. Precision weapons systems are fallible. Even the most advanced weapon system 
can go off course and result in unanticipated civilian casualties. Additionally, as Reynolds 
points out “[relying too heavily on precision technology may result in an overestimation that it 
cannot be rendered errant by guidance system jamming or other counter-measures employed 
be an adaptive adversary.”213 Technologically advanced weapons systems are imperfect.214 
Yet, States have created an expectation that precision guided munitions (PGMs) will hit their 
intended target every time. Canestaro noted this risk as early as 2004, underscoring: 
Ironically, precision warfare might be a victim of its own success in this regard. 
… [C]reated an unrealistic public expectation of swift and low-casualty 
military campaigns. With a "no casualty campaign" arguably now the de facto 
standard for any U.S. military operation, air power has come to be judged by a 
nearly impossible standard. Every instance of unintended collateral damage, no 
matter how reasonable or unavoidable, is interpreted by some as evidence of a 
military failure.215 
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States now insist on a level of perfection that cannot be reliably delivered even with 
technologically advanced weapons. Charles Kels cautions that “[t]he stark reality is that any 
time combat power is employed innocents are likely to be harmed, no matter how cutting-edge 
the technology, prescriptive the policy framework, or conscientious the warfighters.”216  While 
the goal of minimizing civilian casualties is laudable, the expectation that they can be 
eliminated altogether is unrealistic.  
Even if precision munitions could prevent civilian casualties, death and injury from 
conflicts often occur weeks or months after combat operations cease; the casualties of indirect 
harm.217 According to Professor Neta Crawford, “[i]ndirect harm occurs when wars’ 
destruction leads to long term, “indirect,” consequences for people’s health in war zones, for 
example because of loss of access to food, water, health facilities, electricity or other 
infrastructure.”218 Indirect deaths are the eventual result of State action, and while not 
considered civilian casualties for purposes of State execution of a strike, these victims of war 
are certainly civilian casualties nonetheless.  
Although the indirect death toll is difficult to estimate, research indicates that “between 
three and 15 times as many people die indirectly for every person who dies violently [during a 
combat operation].”219 Deaths caused by a fractured health care system, malnutrition and 
psychological trauma far outnumber deaths from combat.220 According to the United Nation’s 
2018 REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, conflicts result in “…reverberating effects on 
                                                          
216 Charles Kels, Civilian Casualties and the Law-Policy Conundrum, OPINIOJURIS, July 6, 2017, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/07/civilian-casualties-and-the-law-policy-conundrum/.  
217 Human Costs, WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF., https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human (last 
visited May 4, 2019).  
218 Neta Crawford, Human Costs of the Post-9/11 Wars: Lethality and the Need for Transparency, WATSON 
INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF. 2 (Nov. 2018).  
219 Neta Crawford, War Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014, 
WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF. 20 (May 22, 2015).  
220 Civilians Killed and Wounded, WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF., 






water and electricity systems that increase the risk and spread of disease and food insecurity. 
Civilians are displaced and may lack access to lifesaving and other assistance and remain 
exposed to further violence.”221 
Widespread trauma is another legacy of conflicts. Columbia University’s Michael 
Wessells found that: 
Conflicts create extensive emotional and psychosocial stress associated with 
attack, loss of loved ones, separation from parents and destruction of home and 
community. Many children develop problems, such as flashbacks, nightmares, 
social isolation, heightened aggression, depression and diminished future 
orientation. These problems of mental health and psychosocial functioning 
persist long after the fighting has ceased and make it difficult for children, who 
may comprise half the population, to benefit fully from education or to 
participate in post-conflict reconstruction.222  
But war trauma extends to a population greater than just children. A review of research findings 
found that “among the consequences of war, the impact on the mental health of the civilian 
population is one of the most significant. … Women are affected more than men. Other 
vulnerable groups are children, the elderly and the disabled.”223 Additionally, to further 
compound the devastating effects of combat, a recent study indicates that individuals now 
indirectly exposed to terror may develop psychological issues.224   
Displacement is also an ongoing reality for those affected by conflicts. According to 
the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) the global community is witnessing the highest 
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levels of displacement on record, with 68.5 million people around the world forced from their 
homes.225 The United Nations reports that: 
Refugees and internally displaced persons were exposed to serious protection 
risks, including killings, sexual and gender-based violence, torture, forced 
recruitment, trafficking in persons, early and forced marriage and arbitrary 
arrest and detention. Children, especially unaccompanied or separated children, 
are particularly vulnerable. Several attacks on camps or sites for internally 
displaced persons were reported, including in Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, South 
Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.226 
These refugees and internally displaced persons face a lack of health care, food and water 
scarcity, homelessness, no access to sanitation, as well as a host of other concerns. These issues 
affect the millions impacted by conflict. By the end of 2017, there were 12.6 million forcibly 
displaced Syrians. Other large displaced populations included Iraq (3.3 million), Somalia (3.2 
million), and Nigeria (2.0 million).227 
 THE GUARDIAN estimates that over 34,000 displaced persons, many of them emanating 
from conflict zones, have died.228 These deaths occur in detention centers and during the 
daunting journey both on land and at sea. If you do not recall the name Alan Kurdi you will 
surely recognize the photograph of him; the image of the dead Syrian toddler lying face down 
in the surf.229 Alan was from Kobani, Syria. His family fled during the fighting between the 
Islamic State and Kurdish forces. His brother and mother also died when their dinghy sank off 
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the Turkish coast.230 Alan is just one story of the thousands. The perils and tribulations facing 
displaced persons can never be overemphasized.  
Restricted targeting regimes create an expectation of bloodless and deathless wars. But 
when combat operations are over, civilian populations are left to deal with the remnants of war. 
While anything more than zero civilian casualties has become unpalatable, wounds from war 
are not confined to the battlefield. As Sandro Galea, Dean of Boston University’s School of 
Public Health recognizes: 
It is in the nature of war to degrade the fabric of the societies it affects. The 
destruction is comprehensive—it wears away at a country’s economy, its 
environment, its infrastructure, and the physical and mental health of its 
population. The plight of those displaced by wars, who become refugees for 
years and decades, is heart-breaking…231 
However much society wishes it were so, modern day wars cannot be won without civilian 
casualties. Even with remarkable advancements in technology, a State cannot win a war 
without inflicting collateral harm, both direct and direct. The only way to avoid civilian 
casualties is to stop going to war. It is an unfortunate reality that civilians die in war, but it is a 
reality nonetheless.  
The last unintentional consequence of restrictive targeting regimes is likely the one 
most relevant to international legal scholars, the development of a new standard of 
proportionality under customary international law (CIL). The theory of CIL defines custom as 
a practice that emerges and which individuals, organizations, and states follow in the course of 
their interactions, out of a sense of legal obligation.232 Customary international law is capable 
of creating universally binding rules. This binding force rests on the implied consent of States 
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expressed via action and practice.233 And though customary international law results from a 
general and consistent practice of States, it can be developed rapidly in quickly evolving areas 
of the law.234  
Article 38(1)(b) of the International Court of Justice Statute defines customary 
international law as "a general practice accepted as law.” The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW states that “[c]ustomary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligations.”235 Both 
definitions mandate two formative elements for the creation of CIL, the quantitative element 
and the qualitative element.236 The quantitative element focuses on the general and consistent 
practice of States. This is the element that is more objective and readily discernible.  The 
qualitative element focuses on the sense of legal obligation or in Latin opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. This is the element that is more subjective. When both the quantitative (objective) 
and qualitative (subjective) elements are present, the international practice gains the status of 
international customary law and States are considered bound by the resulting custom.237   
As to the first formative element, State practice, general practice suffices to generate 
customary rules binding on all States.238 Meanwhile, the ICJ has indicated that the most 
important practice is that of “States whose interests are specially affected.”239 Thus the 
existence of CIL is not solely a numbers game. It may be enough that the practice be 
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representative, so long as it includes States whose interests are specially affected.240 As the 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA states, “the practice relevant for establishing the existence of 
a customary international rule must neither necessarily include all States nor must it be 
completely uniform.”241 This allows for emerging norms within State clusters of multilateral 
practice that are expected to become pervasive over time.242 
The second formative element generally requires that State actions are carried out 
because of a legal obligation. States act in compliance with norms not merely due to ethical 
reasons, convenience or habit, but rather out of a sense of legal obligation. The subjective 
element has been described as “the philosopher’s stone which transmutes the inert mass of 
accumulated usage into the gold of binding legal rules.”243 However, what qualifies as opinion 
juris and even if it is truly required is a debate that continues amongst legal scholars.  
Karol Wolfke takes a traditional approach arguing that “the essence of customary law 
lies in the legalization, mainly by means of acquiesce, of certain factual uniformity in 
international relations.”244 In Wolfke’s estimation CIL is not intentionally created, instead 
“[a]n international custom comes into being when a certain practice becomes sufficiently ripe 
to justify at least a presumption that it has been accepted by other interested states as an 
expression of law.”245 Maurice Mendelson argues that opinio juris is irrelevant given that most 
supporters of the framework normally accept that widespread and representative practice is 
enough and that opinio juris can be inferred from that practice.246 Mendelson’s argument is 
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that this redundancy makes opinio juris obsolete. Professor Frederic Kirgis take a more 
nuanced approach suggesting that there is a “sliding scale” relationship between the amount of 
State practice and opinio juris needed to produce CIL.247 The greater the quantity of States that 
concur in the practice, the less the need for evidence of opinio juiris. 248  
Norman and Trachtman postulate that instead of a “sense of legal obligation,” the 
RESTATEMENT formulation refers to an “intent to create or accept a rule of law.”249 Fon and 
Parisi concur stating that “[p]rior to the solidification of practice into binding custom, States 
engage in actions on a purely voluntary basis, taking into account costs and benefits of the 
actions and their interest in establishing a customary rule that will bind for the future.”250 These 
positions are further supported by Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute that speaks of a “sense of 
incipient legal obligation.”251 The RESTATEMENT language can thus be interpreted as not 
referring to a fully formed legal obligation, but rather a perception that a new rule would be 
beneficial to society. As Judge Lachs wrote in NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF: 
… [T]he motives which have prompted States to accept it [the conviction that 
something is law] have varied from case to case. It could not be otherwise. At 
all events, to postulate that all States, even those which initiate a given practice, 
believe themselves to be acting under a legal obligation is to resort to a fiction 
– and in fact to deny the possibly of developing such rules. For the path may 
indeed start from voluntary, unilateral acts relying on the confident expectation 
that they will find acquiescence or be emulated252  
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Thus, CIL in essence is the normalization of conduct, or the realization of social conduct, 
through multilateral action.  
While traditionally only State conduct and opinio juris have been used to define 
whether an emergent norm has attained CIL status, according to Matthew Scharf there is an 
overlooked third factor. This third factor is “a context of fundamental change—that can serve 
as an accelerating agent” enabling CIL to develop rapidly. Scharf argues, in part relying on the 
International Court of Justice’s North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 253 that seismic shifts in the 
international system can lead to the rapid development of international law, challenging the 
once held notion of its protracted formation.254 New principles of CIL can thus arise with 
“exceptional velocity.” 255   
Scharf calls these Grotian Moments and explains them as “a paradigm-shifting 
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with 
unusual rapidity and acceptance.”256 Per Scharf, a Grotian Moment: 
[C]onstitutes of an acceleration of the custom-formation process due to states’ 
widespread and unequivocal response to a paradigm-changing event in 
international law, such as the unprecedented human suffering from the 
atrocities of World War II and the related recognition that there could be 
international criminal responsibility for violations of international law.257 
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They respond to technological, economic, or societal change. The MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA concurs with Scharf observing that, “recent developments show that customary 
rules may come into existence rapidly…[t]his can be due to the urgency of coping with new 
developments of technology…or it may be due to the urgency of coping with widespread 
sentiments of moral outrage.”258   
 We may be in the midst of a Grotian Moment as there is no greater moral outrage in 
today’s wars than the killing of innocent civilians.  Additionally, that only a handful of States 
have restricted targeting regimes is irrelevant as in a multilateral setting, it is enough that 
formative elements of a custom are present for “specially affected” States.259 Furthermore, 
rapidly formed CIL does not have to be fully fleshed out or rigidly fashioned.260 Grotian 
Moments merely require some underpinning of State practice.261   
States must heed the warning of the possibility of rapidly formed customary 
international law resulting from the morale outrage of civilian casualties. Potentially, public 
release of State rationale for targeting restrictions may be used to claim persistent objector 
status or rebut opinio juris. However, without the acknowledgement of State’s moral 
imperative driving these policies the global community may mistakenly believe that a new 
legal obligation is being formulated. If the U.S. and other States want to ensure that targeting 
restrictions remain a voluntary practice they must continue to express – both in words and in 
deeds – that prescriptive policies are an attempt to hold themselves to stricter standards than 
the law of war dictates; not change the law of war.    
A new frame of proportionality under CIL would forever change war. States would be 
hamstrung in their ability to defeat an adversary if even the unintentional death of one civilian 
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was seen as a violation of international law. Warfare would be prolonged due to State fear of 
miscalculation, and the world would watch as civilian populations were brutally massacred by 
insurgents. These bespoke norms may eventually develop into a new form of customary 
international law, forever undermining the intrinsic right of States to defeat an adversary and 
hindering their ability to protect civilian populations.   
 
V. Conclusion 
It is a year in the not too distance future. A bloody civil war in Libya has just abated, 
leaving the country in chaos. The successor to the Islamic State - whomever they may be - has 
used the power vacuum created by the civil war to take control of a vast swatch of territory. 
The world watches as this new organization slaughters innocent civilians. The international 
community is pummeled with videos, social media posts, and news articles of beheadings, 
mutilations, rapes, and mass executions. The world response is overwhelmingly supportive of 
liberating the civilian population. The United Nations Security Council even issues an Article 
VII Resolution262 calling for ‘any and all means necessary’ - allowing military action.   
Strike assets are in the air and special forces are on the ground; where they wait.  
Reconnaissance footage shows insurgents taking over schools, hospitals, mosques, power 
plants, and civilian homes – creating military communications nodes or weapons depots in 
each location. These insurgents are tactically and strategically savvy; they surround themselves 
with civilians knowing that the Coalition’s precision guided munitions are accurate within 
meters. Society mandates a conflict without civilian casualties and now the Coalitions’ hands 
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are tied, they cannot possibly liberate the city without inflicting civilian casualties. The 
urbanized nature of the fight, and the tactics of the adversary will not allow it.  
This narrative unfortunately sounds all too familiar and all too realistic. In today’s wars 
States take extreme measures to avoid harm to civilian populations. They use precision 
weaponry, heed the advice of military lawyers, and have introduced proscriptions on targeting. 
Professor Gabby Blum reminds us that States today are “more restrained, and more 
constrained” in their methods of warfare and they are “more concerned…with the wellbeing 
of the civilians they affect.”263 However, State measures will never be enough to eradicate 
war’s harms to civilians; they are inherent in the nature of war.   
It is understandable that the concept of proportionality in IHL is puzzling and 
controversial to society. It makes sense to live in a society that does not condone the killing of 
innocents. However, while that is an honorable aspiration, it is not the law. IHL instead 
recognizes the brutality and reality of war. It mandates that parties to a conflict conduct a 
delicate balancing act between civilian casualties and military advantage. But we cannot fault 
States for restricting proportionality, it is after all the moral thing to do.  
However, these restrictions are not entirely altruistic. State policies exist because of a 
political choice. A choice driven by fear of alienating domestic audiences, damaging foreign 
relations, and, media rebuke. State policies restricting proportionality and capping the civilian 
death toll make sense in a world where politicians have to answer for State actions.  And while 
the advent of targeting restrictions that go beyond what IHL requires may be seen as a step 
towards minimizing the collateral consequences of war – one supported by general society, 
States are naïve if they do not acknowledge the risks these same policies pose to civilians in 
particular and to the conduct of war generally.  
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First is the increased brutality to civilians. Restrictions on State action provide 
insurgents with increased freedom of maneuver to carry out vicious attacks on civilians. 
Assassinations, beatings, and detention will be the norm. Sexual violence against women and 
children will be rampant. The moral hazard of inaction will ring particularly true if States are 
incapable of targeting the enemy. States must pay homage to the idea that inaction ultimately 
poses risks to civilian populations. If insurgents are neutralized, they are no longer a threat to 
civilian populations. States save lives by killing insurgents. 
Second is amplified civilian endangerment. Restrictive targeting regimes incentivizes 
commingling with civilian populations, the use of human shields, and the practice of lawfare 
to combat State military power. Insurgents will continue to take advantage of State policies 
and utilize civilian populations to immunize themselves from strikes. Targeting restrictions 
also perversely induces the abhorrent lawfare practice of sending civilians to their death by 
hiding them in military facilities for the sole purpose of inducing military engagement. 
Insurgents are then able to condemn State action as the murder of innocents. Targeting 
restrictions remove any incentives insurgents have for complying with IHL; now doing so will 
put them at both a tactical and strategic disadvantage.  
Third, targeting restrictions create an unrealistic expectation of a perfect war. Precision 
weaponry is not infallible and it may never be. Additionally, war’s reverberations are felt long 
after battles have abated. Psychological trauma, limited access to water, food, and healthcare, 
and the displacement of millions will continue even if States are inexplicably able to execute 
kinetic warfare without civilian casualties. States policies restricting targeting have 
inadvertently set an unachievable standard for war; one now expected from society. A world 






Fourth, this new normative framework may forever change the concept of 
proportionality under international law. If restrictive targeting and the requirement for zero 
civilian casualties evolves into customary international law it will forever change the nature of 
war. States will be stymied in their ability to engage the enemy and wars will be prolonged 
evolutions. A State’s ability to defeat an adversary will be inherently undermined as concerns 
about unintentionally violating the new law will permeate operations. The conduct of war 
would be irrevocably changed.  
In the words of Yoram Dinstein, “war is hell.” International humanitarian law has “not 
undertaken a mission impossible of purporting to eliminate the hellish consequences of war. 
What [IHL] strives to do is reduce these consequences.”264 Today, States have placed 
themselves in an untenable position, promising society they will do more, while simultaneously 
hamstringing their own ability to protect civilian populations; a dangerous position for 
everyone concerned – except the insurgents.  
States must be cognizant of the inherent dangers of positing a policy doctrine of a 
perfect strike. Because a perfect strike may ultimately be imperfect to a State’s ability to protect 
civilians and defeat an adversary. States comply with IHL even when their adversaries do not; 
but war remains imperfect and civilian casualties are inevitable. Civilians are subject to the 
perils of war so long as wars exist. Given the United Nations’ mandate of a responsibility to 
protect, 265 States simply cannot restrict targeting to the extent that it further endangers civilian 
populations around the globe; it is hypocritical at best and devastating at worst.  
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